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__________ 
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__________ 
 
CHARLES E. GARRETT, III; GILDA T. GARRETT, 
       Appellants 
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 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States Tax Court 
(IRS-1 : 17-25282) 
Tax Court Judge: Honorable L. Paige Marvel 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
 November 1, 2019 
 
BEFORE:  HARDIMAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed December 18, 2019) 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________ 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service sent a certified mail joint 
notice of deficiency and penalties—pursuant to I.R.C. § 6212(a)1—to the last 
known address of appellants Charles and Gilda Garrett.  But the Garretts had 
moved to a new address and never received the notice.  They petitioned for a 
redetermination, claiming that the notice was invalid.  The United States Tax Court 
concluded—pursuant to I.R.C. § 6213(a)2—that it lacked jurisdiction because the 
Garretts’ petition was not timely.  It granted the Commissioner’s motion to 
dismiss.  On appeal, the Garretts continue to claim that the notice is invalid.  We 
will affirm.3 
To determine whether the Tax Court was correct we must first decide if 
Section 6213(a) is jurisdictional.4  Our analysis focuses on the ‘“text, context, and 
relevant historical treatment”’ of the law.5  We, first, examine the plain language of 
                                              
1 26 U.S.C. § 6212(a). 
2 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a). 
3 We review the Tax Court’s dismissal of the taxpayers’ petition for lack of jurisdiction 
de novo.  Sunoco, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 663 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
4 See Rubel v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 856 F.3d 301, 304 (3d Cir. 2017).  A 
jurisdictional statute in this context is distinguished from a claim-processing statute that 
does not speak to a court’s authority but rather “promote[s] the orderly progress of 
litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified 
times.”  Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011).    
5 Rubel, 856 F.3d at 304 (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc., v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166 
(2010)).   
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the statute to determine whether the words refer to ‘“the power of the court rather 
than to the rights or obligations of the parties.’”6  Section 6213(a) states as follows: 
Within 90 days . . . after the notice of deficiency authorized in 
section 6212 is mailed (not counting Saturday, Sunday, or a 
legal holiday in the District of Columbia as the last day), the 
taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a 
redetermination of the deficiency. . . . The Tax Court shall 
have no jurisdiction to enjoin any action or proceeding or 
order any refund under this subsection unless a timely petition 
for a redetermination of the deficiency has been filed and then 
only in respect of the deficiency that is the subject of such 
petition. Any petition filed with the Tax Court on or before 
the last date specified for filing such petition by the Secretary 
in the notice of deficiency shall be treated as timely filed.7 
 
Congress spoke in unequivocal terms, stating that the Tax Court “shall have no 
jurisdiction” unless a petition to redetermine a deficiency is timely filed.8  Because it 
used these words we know that Congress was addressing the court’s power, rather than 
the rights and obligations of the parties.9  Moreover, it is noteworthy that the statute 
specifically addresses which court actions are authorized and prohibited based on a 
party’s compliance with the filing time limit of this petition.  The unambiguous language 
combined with this tight linkage between the court’s authority and a statutory deadline 
leads inevitably—without resorting to further analysis—to the conclusion that Congress 
                                              
6 Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994)).   
7 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a) (emphasis added). 
8 Id.   
9 See Rubel, 856 F.3d at 305. 
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limited the court’s authority to review only Section 6212(a) petitions that are timely 
filed.10  Therefore, Section 6213(a) is jurisdictional.11 
We next review whether the Tax Court correctly determined that the 
Garretts’ petition is untimely.  No one disputes the facts on which the Tax Court 
relied.  The Commissioner sent the notice of deficiency by certified mail to the 
Garretts’ address as it was known to the Commissioner on the date it posted, 
April 10, 2017.12  The Garretts filed their petition with the Tax Court on 
December 5, 2017, 239 days after the Commissioner mailed the notice, long after 
the ninety days mandated by Section 6213(a).   
The Garretts argue that the Commissioner knew their new address on 
April 12, 2017, and that by failing to act on this knowledge (particularly after the 
notice was returned undelivered) the Commissioner violated their due process 
rights which invalidated the notice.  The Commissioner agrees that the Garretts’ 
address changed in Internal Revenue Service records on April 12, 2017, but relies 
on I.R.C. § 6212(b) which specifies that notice sent to the taxpayer’s “last known 
                                              
10 Id. 
11 This is consistent with jurisprudence acknowledging that filing deadlines in tax statutes 
are generally treated as jurisdictional because the Commissioner has a demonstrable 
“need for ‘finality and certainty’” to ensure a stream of revenue that is predictable.  Id. at 
306 (quoting Becton Dickinson & Co., v. Wolckenhauer, 215 F.3d 340, 351 (3d Cir. 
2000) accord United States v. Brockcamp, 519 U.S. 347, 349-54 (1997)).   
12 This address is the one that appeared on the Garretts’ federal tax return for the year 
2015, filed on October 14, 2016.  See Treas. Reg. § 301.6212-2(a) (The last known 
address is that which appears on the most recently filed tax return.).   
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address” is sufficient.  Congress designed the requirement in Section 6212(a) that 
the Commissioner use the last known address to give the Commissioner safe 
harbor by allowing constructive notice.13  The Garretts cite to no other portion of 
this statute that imposes any additional requirements on the Commissioner to 
provide valid notice.  Moreover, examining the equities of individual 
circumstances, as the Garretts advocate here, runs contrary to the purpose of a 
jurisdictional filing deadline.14  Hence, on April 10, 2017, the date the notice 
posted, the Commissioner fulfilled its requirement for sufficient notice under the 
law. 
Therefore, for all of these reasons, we will affirm the order of the Tax Court.  
                                              
13 See Gyorgy v. Commissioner Internal Revenue, 779 F.3d 466, 473 (7th Cir. 2015); see 
also Cropper v. Commissioner Internal Revenue, 826 F.3d 1280, 1285 (10th  Cir. 2016).  
The Garretts’ reliance on  Jones v Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006) is unpersuasive as it 
does not refer to a petition for an opportunity to receive prepayment review of a 
deficiency under Section 6212(a), nor does it refer to Section 6213(a). 
14 See Brockcamp, 519 U.S. at 352 (“Tax law . . . is not normally characterized by case-
specific exceptions reflecting individualized equities.”). 
 
